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Chapter 3 - Normative Perspectives on Transnational Social Rights
- from PART I - TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS IN CONTEXT
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- By Georg Lohmann, Professor emeritus of Practical Philosophy at the Ottovon- Guericke University Magdeburg
- Edited by Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Kolja Möller
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- Book:
- Transnationalisation of Social Rights
- Published by:
- Intersentia
- Published online:
- 12 December 2017
- Print publication:
- 10 June 2016, pp 49-66
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Summary
INTRODUCTION
The various modes of globalisation have made us conscious of the fact that the inequalities in life chances and increasing poverty are now the problems of a global society. The struggles against discrimination, exclusion and other forms of injustice can no longer solely be aligned within the respective state borders, but must, in order to be successful, (also) be conducted transnationally and globally. Social struggles emerge around concrete and local experiences of injustice. But then, the normative demands and justifications have to address the transnational roots of these injustices, and national actors tend to turn into international actors. Therewith, the framework of social struggles and of normative justification changes. The field ranges from voluntary, humanitarian aid to moral demands of global social justice and the enforcement of transnational social rights. Social rights, which traditionally protect and defend the life chances of citizens in a domestic frame, now need be conceived as transnational social rights and need transnational orientations and justifications. This chapter seeks to determine, from a philosophical point of view, which conceptual and argumentative problems can be found in these normative perspectives.
CONCEPTIONAL AND SYSTEMATIC CLARIFICATIONS
“TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS” AS HUMAN RIGHTS
I would like to understand “transnational social rights” as human rights. Frequently, human rights are seen – unfortunately, particularly by moral philosophers – as purely “moral rights” which merely correspond to “moral obligations” for all. This is, in many ways, not just one-sided, but will frequently lead to false and distorting considerations and conclusions. Human rights, properly understood, have three dimensions, which cannot be reduced to one another: a moral, a legal, and a political-historical dimension. They are motivated by historical processing of experiences of grave injustices and crimes against humanity; since the Second World War, international (political-given, legally-constituted and morally-justifiable) human rights, have been accredited in the same way to every human being in virtue of his or her human dignity. Thus, philosophical reflections on human rights should not only methodically emanate from the legal (national and international) human-rights documents, but must also track each other's separate considerations in political and moral terms.
11 - Human dignity and socialism
- from Part I - Origins of the concept in European history
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- By Georg Lohmann, University of Magdeburg
- Edited by Marcus Düwell, Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands, Jens Braarvig, Universitetet i Oslo, Roger Brownsword, King's College London, Dietmar Mieth, Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen, Germany
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- Book:
- The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity
- Published online:
- 05 March 2015
- Print publication:
- 10 April 2014, pp 126-134
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Summary
Conceptual clarifications: general overview
The concepts of human dignity and socialism are both extremely indefinite and should here be understood in a broad sense. I will only briefly indicate how the concept ‘human dignity’ is here used (Lohmann 2013). Historically, social conceptions of a particular dignity and honour (for example, of a position, of a class, due to special achievements) can be differentiated from conceptions of general dignity accorded to all humans (for different reasons: for example ontological position in the cosmos, capacity to reason, creation in the image of god). Since the new beginning of international law after the Second World War, universal human dignity has been tied to the possession of human rights. Human dignity as a ‘basis’ of human rights is a morally grounded norm enacted as nationally and internationally applicable law through the shaping of political will. To respect, protect and guarantee these rights are in the first instance duties of the respective state, second of all states, and by means of a ‘horizontal effect’ of all humans as well. The content of ‘human dignity’ refers to the capabilities of humans for free, reflected self-determination, to their equal legal recognition and self-recognition and to the conditions of a minimum subsistence level which allow a life worthy of human dignity (in German, menschenwürdiges Leben).
‘Socialism’ is an equally encompassing concept applicable to different conceptions of society which aspire to a social organization of the economy, of ownership structures, of society and/or of the state in criticism of capitalism and its associated individualism. Historically, the concept first appears as a category of philosophy of law (sozialismo, A. Buonafede, 1798), following Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, in order to establish natural law on the basis of sociability against catholic views (Schnieder 1984). In England, the concept has been used only since 1837 for the designation of Robert Owen's visions of society (Cole 1962). The development of socialist movements and corresponding conceptions range from early socialism (or, in Engels’ terms, ‘utopian socialism’, 1789–1848) in France, Marx’ scientific socialism and numerous variations (anarchistic socialism, state socialism, reform socialism, market socialism, democratic socialism etc.), the creation of labour unions and socialist, communist or social democrat parties in Europe to the present (Schnieder 1984; Wildt 2008). The different conceptions of socialism have highly differing normative ideas and demands.